In its white paper titled, “Regional Ethnic Autonomy in Tibet” the Chinese government claims that Tibet became a part of the territory of China in the 13^th century. This evidently acknowledges the fact that Tibet existed as a separate country before the 13^th century, a fact, which in the past China refused to acknowledge. China's assertion that Tibet became a part of China since 13^th century is also based on the assumption that China inherited the rights of the Mongol Dynasty that conquered and controlled China and vast territories of Asia, Europe and Tibet in 13^th century.  

Tibet came under the Mongols in 1207 before the conquest of China by Mongolia in 1280. And Tibet had also regained her independence from the Mongols in 1358 [1] , a decade before China did in 1368. The Mongolian subjugation of Tibet and China are therefore unrelated as Tibet and China came under Mongolian domination at different times and attained their independence at different times. So when China regained its independence from Mongolia after Tibet, how can China claim that Tibet became a part of China? Thus its unsubstantiated claim over Tibet is a sheer mockery of historical facts.  

In the 13^th century the Mongols began to extend their influence and Tibet submitted to the Mongols in 1207 while China was overwhelmed by about 1280. The only period when Tibet and China were in the same political grouping was when Tibetans and Chinese were both subject peoples under Mongol rule. It seems that the Chinese, in continuing to claim that Tibet was part of China, inherited the expansionist and imperialist designs of a conquering empire whose rule they eventually threw off. It has sometimes been pointed out that by using similar arguments India could now lay claim to Burma on the grounds that they were once both part of the British Empire [2] .

The Chinese in their white paper failed to mention the fact that the relationship between Mongol Khans or emperors and Tibetan lamas predated the Mongol conquest of China. Prince Goden, Genghis Khan's grandson and the ruler of Kokonor, dispatched an expedition to Tibet in 1240 and invited one of Tibet's leading religious hierarchs, Sakya Pandita Kunga Gyaltsen (1182-1251), to his court, thus establishing an enduring Tibet-Mongolia relationship. This relationship was significant as it established a unique relationship known in Tibetan as the Cho-yon or “priest-patron” relationship.            

Kublai Khan who succeeded Goden Khan, embraced Tibetan Buddhism and adopted Drogon Choegyal Phagpa, nephew of Sakya Pandita, as his spiritual mentor. This cho-yon relationship resulted in Kublai Khan adopting Buddhism as his empire's state religion, and Drogon Choegyal Phagpa became the highest spiritual authority. In gratitude, Kublai Khan offered his Tibetan lama political authority over Tibet in 1254. These early cho-yon relationships formed the basis for the future unique relation not only between Mongol princes and Tibetan lamas but also between Manchu emperors and successive Dalai Lamas.            

It is undeniable that Mongol emperors spread their influence over Tibet but none of the Mongol rulers ever administered Tibet directly nor did Tibet ever paid tax or tribute to the Mongol empire unlike China. Tibet's political relationship with Mongols broke down in 1358 when the Tibetan king, Situ Jangchup Gyaltsen (reign: 1358-1364), replaced the Sakya Lamas as the most powerful ruler of Tibet and introduced a new and distinct Tibetan administrative system.  

Michael C. van Walt van Praag in his book entitled The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law rightly states:  

Tibet had come under Kublai Khagan's domination before his conquest of China; it had also regained its actual independence before China did (1368). The Mongol subjugations of Tibet and China were therefore unrelated. The Mongol-Tibetan relationship was, moreover, an expression of a racial, cultural, and above all, religious affinity between the two peoples­­­–an affinity that neither shared with the Chinese. That bond remained even after the fall of the Yuan Dynasty and has been a determining factor in Central Asian politics ever since. [3]  

As noted, it was only in 1368 that the Mongol rule came to an end in China. Therefore before the founding of the Ming Dynasty, Tibet was independent. And for eighty-six years from 1349-1435 A.D. Tibet was ruled by a succession of eleven lamas of Phagmo Drugpa lineage [4] .  

The Ming Dynasty, later, following the custom of the earlier Mongol court, invited a new spiritual teacher from Tibet. But no ruling Lama of any standing accepted the invitation because the relationship between the two countries was different from that which Tibet had with the Mongols.  

For instance, the Chinese Emperor, Yunglo (1403-24) invited Tsongkapa (1357-1419), founder of the Gelugpa sect in 1409 to visit China. The invitation was declined four times and finally he sent one of his disciples, Jamchen Choeje Shakya Yeshi. This clearly indicated that the Tibetan lamas were not under any sway of the Ming court, as was the case when the Mongol rule was there in China [5] .  

In 1579, a delegation from the Ming Court invited the 3^rd Dalai Lama to visit China. But He declined. Again in 1615, the Fourth Dalai Lama was invited by Shen Tung Emperor, “for the express purpose of blessing the Buddhist temple at Nanking…for one or the other reason, the Dalai Lama refused the invitation.  

In 1642, the kings of neighbouring kingdoms like Sikkim, Nepal, Ladakh and Indian states sent their representatives to Lhasa to honour the inauguration of (the new Government) Gaden Phodrang. Sikkim history records that the Dalai Lama assured full assistance and support to Phuntsok Namgyal (1604-44), the first king of Sikkim when needed [6] .  

Likewise in 1646, the Ladakh king Delek Namgyal agreed to sent his triennial present (Lochak) to the Tibetan Government. The new Sikkim ruler, Tensung Namgyal (1644-1670), visited Lhasa to personally convey his respect to the Dalai Lama and to seek advice in introducing the sixteen Tibetan code of law in Sikkim.  

Tibet, during the reign of the fifth Dalai Lama, never considered the then Manchu Government in China as “ the Central Government” as alleged. There is not a single document to prove it. Neither there exists any treaty between the Tibetan and the Manchus on this account. Nor the Tibetans pay any taxes to the Manchus. Since the founding of the Ming Dynasty, Mongolia, Tibet and China were sovereign countries on an equal footing. For instance, in 1665, Emperor K'ang-hsi requested the Dalai Lama to mediate to bring a peaceful settlement with the Mongols. An agreement was reached with the mediation of Tibetan representatives.    

Again in 1674 the Manchu Emperor sensed an internal revolt and sent three officials to Tibet, asking for the help of Tibetan and Mongol troops. The Dalai Lama replied,  

“…Your father, Sun-chih Emperor, was particularly kind and gracious to me when I visited China, and I have always prayed for the peace and prosperity of your country (emphasis added) … I do not think they would be of much assistance to you and feel it would be unwise to send them to China”.  

As Owen Lattimore points out in reference to the Manchu Dynasty (1644-1911), “What existed in fact was a Manchu Empire, of which China formed only one part.” [Studies in Frontier History] Further Manchu emperor's intervention in Tibet occurred in 1790 when Ambans took up residence in Lhasa. The Ambans were not viceroys or administrators, but were essentially ambassadors appointed to look after Manchu interests.  

The Tibetans also experienced such interference at the hands of other powers such as Britain, which began to extend its influence during the second half of the 18^th century. The British imperialist expedition was sent to Lhasa in 1904 to forestall possible Russian influence in Tibet. In 1908 Manchu emperor attempted to establish authority over Tibet by force, largely in order to remove increasing British influence in Tibet. In 1910, His Holiness the Thirteenth Dalai Lama fled to India as a result of this occupation, which was nevertheless short-lived. Resistance to the invasion succeeded when the Manchu empire collapsed and Tibetans forced the occupying army to surrender. After returning to Lhasa, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a proclamation reaffirming the independence of Tibet on 14 February 1913. So these historical instances clearly proves beyond any doubt the absurdity of the Chinese claims [7] .  

The white paper claims that the traditional Tibetan society was feudal and ruled by a theocracy. It describes China's military invasion of Tibet as “liberation”. Today, this fable is repeatedly rehashed by China to justify its invasion and occupation of Tibet.  

It is true that traditional Tibetan society - like most of its Asian contemporaries - was backward and badly in need of reforms. However, it is completely wrong to use the word “feudal” from the perspective of medieval Europe to describe traditional Tibetan society. Tibet before the invasion was far more egalitarian than most Asian countries of the time.  

The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan leaders have time and again conceded the need to introduce reforms in Tibet's traditional society and initiated far-reaching reforms. The International Commission of Jurists in its 1960 report on Tibet states:  

Chinese allegations that the Tibetans enjoyed no human rights before the entry of the Chinese were found to be based on distorted and exaggerated accounts of life in Tibet. Accusations against the Tibetan "rebels" of rape, plunder and torture were found to have been deliberately fabricated and in other cases unworthy of belief for this and other reasons.  

The Tibetan polity before the Chinese occupation was not theocratic as China claims. Rather the system of rule was based on choesi-sungdrel, which is based on a political system inspired by the Buddhist tenets of compassion, moral integrity and equality. The system of reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, the head of spiritual and secular administration, ensured that the right to rule did not become hereditary. Most of the Dalai Lamas, including the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth, came from common peasant families from various parts of Tibet.  

Every administrative post below the Dalai Lama was held by an equal number of monks and lay officials. Although lay officials held hereditary posts, those of monks were open to all. Admission to the monastic institutions in Tibet was open to all and monasteries offered equal opportunities for monks to rise to any position based on the merits of their own scholarship. A large proportion of monk officials, including those in the highest positions, came from non-privileged backgrounds, often from remote and far-flung areas. A popular Tibetan aphorism says: “If the mother's son has the knowledge, the golden throne of Gaden (the highest position in the hierarchy of the Gelug School of Tibetan Buddhism) has no owner”.           

The peasants, whom the Chinese white paper insists on calling “serfs”, had legal identity documents stating their rights, and also had access to courts of law. Peasants had the right to sue their masters and carry their case to higher authorities. Throughout Tibetan history, the maltreatment and suppression of peasants by estate-holders was forbidden by law as well as by social convention. From the time of the seventh century, Tibetan emperor Songtsen Gampo and many Tibetan rulers issued codes based on the Buddhist principle of “Ten Virtues of the Dharma”. The essence of this was that the rulers should act as parents to their subjects. In 1909, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a regulation conferring on all peasants the right to appeal directly to him in case of maltreatment by estate holders. The Tibetan Buddhist belief in compassionate acts as a check on uncharitable deeds, not only against fellow human beings, but also against animals and the environment.  

All land belonged to the state, which granted estates, to monasteries and to individuals who had rendered great service to the state. The state, in turn, received revenues and service from estate holders. Lay estate holders either paid land revenues or provided one male member from each generation to work as a government official. Monasteries performed religious functions for the state and, most vitally, served as schools, universities and centres for Tibetan art, craft, medicine and culture. The role of monasteries as highly disciplined centres of Tibetan education was the key to the traditional Tibetan way of life.  

The large proportion of land in Tibet was held by peasants who paid their revenue directly to the state, which was the main source of the government food stock, distributed to monasteries, the army, and officials without estates. Some paid in labour, and some were required to provide transport service to government officials, and in some cases to monasteries. Land held by the peasants was heritable. The peasants could lease it to others or mortgage it. The peasants could be dispossessed of their land only if they failed to pay the dues of produce or labour, which were not excessive. In practice, the peasants had the rights of free-holders, and dues to the state were a form of land tax paid in kind rather than rent.  

The Fourteenth Dalai Lama introduced various fundamental and far-reaching administrative and land reforms. He created a Special Reform Committee, which reduced land tax on peasants. He proposed that all large estate holdings of monasteries and individuals should revert to state-ownership for distribution among the peasants and approved the proposal for debt exemption for poor peasants submitted by this committee. The Dalai Lama ordered that in future no transport service should be demanded without the special sanction of the government.  

Famine and starvation were unheard of in independent Tibet. There were, of course, years of poor harvest and crop failures. But people could easily borrow from the buffer stock held by the district administrations, monasteries and rich farmers. In his book, Tibet and its History, Hugh Richardson wrote: “Even communist writers have had to admit there was no great difference between rich and poor in (pre-1949) Tibet.” In fact, when Hu Yaobang saw the extent of the poverty in Central Tibet in 1980, he stated that the living standard should be brought up at least to the pre-1959 level.                                    

The numerous foreign visitors in Tibet vouch that the Chinese allegation of prevalence of inhuman treatment and punishments in Tibet is misleading. In Tibet's traditional society the power to inflict mutilation existed in theory but it was only rarely put into effect [8] . Capital punishment was banned in Tibet. In 1898, Tibet enacted a law abolishing any forms of severe punishment, except in cases of high treason or conspiracy against the state. The 13^th Dalai Lama issued a regulation conferring on all peasants the right to appeal directly to him in case of mistreatment by estate holders.

   

“Seventeen-Point Agreement”  

In April 1951, the Tibetan Government sent a five-member delegation to Beijing, led by Kalon Ngabo Ngawang Jigme. The Tibetan Government authorized its delegation to put forward the Tibetan stand and listen to the Chinese position. In fact, it was instructed to refer all-important matters to Lhasa.  

On 29 April 1951, negotiations opened with the presentation of a draft proposal by the leader of the Chinese delegation. Because the proposal maintained that Tibet was an “integral” part of China, the Tibetan delegation refused to sign. After several days of heated debate, the Chinese tabled a modified draft that was equally unacceptable to the Tibetan delegation. At this point, the Chinese delegates, Li Weihan and Zhang Jinwu, made it plain that the terms, as they now stood, were final and amounted to an ultimatum. The Tibetan delegation was addressed in harsh and insulting terms, threatened with physical violence, and members were virtually kept prisoners. No further discussion was allowed and the Tibetan delegates were cut off and were prevented from contacting their Government for instructions. They were threatened with both personal violence and large-scale military retaliation against Tibet, and were given the onerous choice of either signing the “Agreement” on its own authority or accepting responsibility for an immediate military advance on Lhasa.  

Under immense Chinese pressure, the Tibetan delegation signed the “agreement between the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” on 23 May 1951, without being able to inform the Tibetan Government. The delegation warned the Chinese that they were signing only in their personal capacity and the ‘agreement' was not binding either on the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government. None of this posed an obstacle to the Chinese Government to proceed with a signing ceremony and to announce to the world that an “agreement” had been concluded for the “peaceful liberation of Tibet”. They even certified the document with duplicate seals forged for the purpose of giving it the necessary semblance of authenticity. Radio Beijing broadcast the full text of what came to be known as the “Seventeen-Point Agreement” on 27 May 1951. This was the first time the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government heard of the devastating document. The reaction in Dromo (where the Dalai Lama was staying at that time) and Lhasa was one of shock and disbelief.  

In sharp contrast to the Chinese claim, the Dalai Lama and his government did not act voluntarily in signing the “Agreement”. In fact, Mao Zedong himself, in the Directive of Central Committee of CPC, issued on 6 April 1952, admitted:  

(N)ot only the two silons (i.e., Prime Ministers) but also the Dalai Lama and most of his clique were reluctant to accept the Agreement and are unwilling to carry it out. […] we have a base for this purpose in terms of support among the masses or in the upper stratum [9] .     

Tibetans opposed this “agreement” as nothing less than a death warrant of their centuries-old history of independence. They were particularly indignant with the circumstances under which their delegates had been forced to sign it. In fact, Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhangwa clearly told Chinese Representative Zhang Jingwu in 1952 that the Tibetan “people did not accept the agreement” [10] .  

Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama decided to work with the invading forces in order to save his people and country from total destruction. For eight years, he tried to abide by the terms of this document but China, on the other hand, showed no inclination to honour its own part of the “agreement”. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) immediately set out to inflict unbelievable atrocities upon the Tibetan people in order to hasten the occupation of Tibet and destruction of its distinct identity.

By 1959, the Dalai Lama realized that it is impossible to work with the Chinese authorities any longer. In March of that year he fled Tibet and, on his arrival in India, repudiated the “17-point Agreement” as having been “thrust upon Tibetan Government and people by the threat of arms.”  

The lengthy preamble of the 17-point agreement is typical, often illogical, communist propaganda, which states that the people of Tibet were being liberated from foreign imperialists. This makes little sense, as it is well known that on the eve of the Chinese army's attack on Tibet, hardly any foreigners were in Tibet.  

The text of the 17- point Agreement has several flaws and conflicting stipulations. Article 15 of the agreement (“In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet”) conflicts with article 4 that the Central Government would not alter the existing political system in Tibet. When the Tibetan delegates expressed their disagreement on these conflicting points, the Chinese threatened to renew military attack, and the Tibetans were left with no options but to acquiesce. In addition, article 6 was inconsistent with China's policy that Beijing should maintain control over Tibet, while at the same time, the treaty pledged that the existing political system in Tibet…the establishment, status, function and the power of the Dalai Lama will not be altered.           

The policy of the Chinese in Tibet, notwithstanding the Seventeen-Point Agreement, has been to pursue “local regional autonomy” by the institutions (CPPCC etc), which they envisaged under Article 3. But such institutions changed the political system of Tibet, and altered the status and functions of the Dalai Lama, which are prohibited by Article 4. After the abortive uprising of 1959, all pretence of maintaining the system was dropped and the Tibetan Government was dissolved and the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet was empowered to exercise the function and powers of the ‘local government of Tibet.'            

Similarly, article 1 provides that “the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland,” which suggest that in the past Tibet had not been part of the so-called “big family of the Motherland.” Article 8 stipulates that “Tibetan troops shall be reorganized step by step into the PLA and become a part of the national defence of the PRC,” which acknowledges that Tibet, in the past, had had its own troops and had never been a part of national defence of China. Article 14 specified that “The PRC shall have centralized handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet” corroborates the fact that until the signing of the 17 Point Agreement, Tibet had been managing its own external affairs. History cannot be falsified. All articles in the 17-point Agreement that established Chinese sovereignty over Tibet simply reveal the pre-existing reality of Tibet's independence. Before 1951 China had not controlled Tibet's diplomacy and national defence and therefore had no sovereignty over Tibet. [11]  

In the original decision by the State Council to set up the Preparatory Committee, it was announced that there would be fifty-one members, ten from the Local Government of Tibet, ten from the Panchen Kanpo Lija, ten from the People's Liberation Committee of Chamdo, five from among the cadres sent by the Central People's Government to work in Tibet, and eleven others (from all principal monasteries, religious sects, prominent personages and public bodies). In the final list there were fifty Tibetan members, including the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama and the total membership became fifty-five. [12] There was thus a solid core of at least twenty members from organs set up by the Chinese in Chamdo and Shigatse, together with the Chinese personnel backed by the State Council, under whose direction the Preparatory Committee was to work. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Committee was a façade of Tibetan representation behind which the Chinese exercised effective power. The Dalai Lama said of this Committee in his Tezpur statement on April 18, 1959: “In practice, even this body had little power and decisions in all important matters were taken by the Chinese authorities.” [13]  

Article 11 ensures the authority of local governments of an independent administration. However, the Chinese conception of “national regional autonomy” is obviously sufficiently elastic to allow Chinese leaders to exercise complete authority through subservient local organs. The creation of the People's Liberation Committee of Chamdo and the Panchen Kanpo Lija, followed by their absorption into the PCART, was an alteration of the “existing political structure of Tibet”, contrary to article 4.  

The Dalai Lama himself said with reference to the same article, “Although they had solemnly undertaken to maintain my status and power as the Dalai Lama, they did not lose any opportunity to undermine my authority and to sow dissensions among my people.” [14] Details of the early undermining of the Dalai Lama's authority may be found in Pacific Affairs, June 1959. [15]

The undertaking in article 4 that “officials of various ranks shall continue to hold office as usual” was violated on a large scale at the lower level of administration. The district and village leaders had been executed, or degraded and humiliated. Ginsburgs and Mathos describe Tibet's system of government under Chinese rule: “The whole of Tibet was divided into three levels of local rule: the region; the district magistracy; and the village.” [16] Village and the district leaders were frequently replaced by persons from the lowest classes who were prepared to work with the Chinese.  

The white paper claims, “In April 1956, the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region was established in Lhasa, with the 14th Dalai Lama as the chairman, the 10th Panchen Lama, the first vice-chairman and Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, the Secretary-General. The establishment of the Preparatory Committee enabled Tibet to have a consultative work organ with the nature of a political power, and vigorously promoted the realization of regional ethnic autonomy in Tibet.” But this committee was not set up until December 20, 1959, three years after the establishment of a preparatory office for this purpose. The committee consisted of 134 members, only ten percent of whom are representatives of the peasants and herdsmen.  

The purpose of CPPCC was political rather than constitutional. As Renmin Bao (People's Daily), China's official mouthpiece, puts, “it is not an organization with the character of political power or semi-political power, it is an organization of party character.” [17] . The PLA itself was far from being a merely military force in Tibet, and its local commander, General Chang Kuo-hua, was Vice-Chairman of the PCART. The Political Commissars of the PLA also occupied leading positions in the constitutional structure of Tibet with Tan Kuan-san and his deputy Fan Ming as members of the PCART. Fan Ming was also Assistant Secretary, under Tan Kuan-San, the Vice-Secretary, of the Tibet Work Committee of the CCP. They were all representatives of either the Central People's Government, or PCART. Fan Ming, when reporting on the problems of the nationalities policy to a meeting of a Work Committee, described Tibet's position as “under the intimate concern and correct leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the Central People's Government, under the direct guidance of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Erdeni (Lama) and the Tibetan Work Committee of the CCP”. The degree of self-government left to the Tibetans cannot have been substantial in these circumstances [18] .  

After a great deal of emphasis on the necessity for reforms in Tibet, both Mao Tse-tung [19] and the PCART (at its first session) had supported the introduction of “democratic reform only when conditions were ripe”. [20] According to them the “Tibetan local government” stood in the way of reforms, which the Tibetan people so earnestly desired. The method of reform envisaged in article 11 is for the Tibetan Local Government to act free from compulsion and in consultation with leading persons in Tibet. No Tibetans disputed the need for reform in Tibet and the Dalai Lama has also stressed the need for reform and stated that his own attempts to introduce reforms were frustrated by the Chinese. Dalai Lama states, “I wish to emphasize that I and my Government have never been opposed to the reforms which are necessary in the social, economic and political systems prevailing in Tibet.  In fact, during the last nine years several reforms were proposed by me and my Government but every time these measures were strenuously opposed by the Chinese in spite of popular demand for them, with the result that nothing was done for the betterment of the social and economic conditions of the people. I desire to lay stress on the fact that we, as firm believers in Buddhism, welcome change and progress consistently with the genius of our people and the rich tradition of our country.” [21]  

Whether conditions were ripe or not, the Seventeen-Point Agreement envisaged that decisions on reform should be taken by the “Tibetan local government” and not by the CCP in Beijing. The PCART itself, as the successor of old Tibetan government in the eyes of the Chinese, was given no freedom to decide on reforms.  It received its orders from Beijing. The Tibetan people generally had no say in the so-called reforms, which were imposed upon them through violent methods. The International Commission of Jurists' Legal Inquiry Committee Pointed out that: “It was the Chinese Central authorities who announced the postponement of the reforms in 1957, and no complaint was then made against the Tibetan local government. … In short, the Chinese made all the decisions concerning the reforms. In these circumstances the Tibetan government cannot be condemned for breach of its obligation to carry out reforms.” 

There is no question that under international law the 17-point Agreement had any validity. Treaties and similar agreements concluded under the use of threat of force are invalid under international law ab-initio (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 52 [22] ). This Agreement was a result of China's use of force and threat to use further force against Tibet. The treaty not only lacks validity at the time of its conclusion, but also could not be validated later. His Holiness the Dalai Lama repudiated the Agreement at the first opportunity he had of doing so in freedom, which came only on 20 June 1959, days after he escaped into exile in India. He made the following declaration in an official statement: “The agreement which followed the invasion of Tibet was also thrust upon its people and government by the threat of arms.” [23] The Tibetans never accepted the treaty of their own free will. The consent of the Government was secured under duress and at the point of bayonet.  

It is worth noting that the government of the PRC has consistently held that the treaties imposed by the threat or use of force are invalid, even those concluded in the previous century. [24] Thus, by its own standards, the PRC cannot claim any rights or legitimacy over Tibet on the basis of this Agreement.  

As the International Commission of Jurists showed in its report, Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic [25] , the Chinese government repeatedly violated the terms of the Agreement, a situation that eventually led to the Tibetan uprising and the flight of the Dalai Lama, in 1959. Following these dramatic events, the Chinese government itself openly abrogated the Agreement, stating that it no longer considered itself bound by it. Therefore, it is all the more interesting to note, China's renewed interest in the 17-point Agreement in recent years.            

The 17-point Agreement is embarrassing not only to those who maintain that Tibet has been an independent state, but also to those who hold that Tibet has always been part of China. While legitimising China's occupation of Tibet, the agreement also spells out the fact that before the agreement, Tibet did not belong to China. Otherwise there would be no need for the Chinese authorities to force the Tibetans to sign any agreement. No treaty or agreement should have been necessary had Tibet already been part of China. It would be superfluous and absurd for one part of a country to enter into international treaties with another part of the same country. [26] Thus, the 17-point Agreement has posed a paradox for the Chinese government because if it regards the Agreement as an accomplishment, it has to recognize that Tibet had not been part of China before 1951.  

Michael Van Walt Van Praag, in his The Status of Tibet, rightly argued that the Agreement was not legally valid because the Chinese used war to settle the Tibetan issue and under the General Treaty for Reunification of War, to which the Chinese government was also a signatory, no dispute should be settled “except by pacific means”.  Furthermore, an agreement, treaty or contract is valid only if both contracting parties sign by free and mutual consent, which was hardly the case for the 17-Point Agreement.    

National Uprising  

The White Paper tries to depict the popular resistance and uprising of Tibetans as an armed rebellion staged by few disgruntled people in the upper strata of Tibet to preserve feudal serfdom and in an attempt to separate Tibet from China. Chinese government alleged that the serfs, who account for 95 per cent of the total Tibetan population, were brutally oppressed by a small number of aristocrats and lamas. The obvious question that strikes one's mind is why these allegedly oppressed masses never rose up against their masters, despite the fact that Tibet did not have a national police force and for most of its history had no strong army. In fact, there was never a popular uprising in Tibet until the 1950s when Tibet witnessed the first ever-popular uprising against the Chinese invaders.  

Following the entry of the Chinese troops in Lhasa, the Chinese made every effort to undermine the sovereign authority of the Tibetan government and impose Chinese authority. Various political, economic and social changes were imposed against the wishes of the Tibetans in violation of the 17-Point Agreement. The reforms included among other things, the incorporation of a large portion of Tibetan provinces of Kham and Amdo into Chinese provinces; deployment of a large number of Chinese troops who appropriated thousands of tons of food grains, resulting in the creation of a famine-like situation for the first time in Tibet's history; imposition of taxes on crops, wool and herds as a contribution towards the ‘Aid to Korea' fund; the incursions of a large number of Chinese settlers; and most importantly, the attempt to undermine Tibetan religion and culture. [27]  

The imposition of such ruthless and unwanted changes in Tibetan society provoked a growing sense of dissent among Tibetans. For example in the small town of Doi in Amdo some 300 local leaders were shot in the back of the head before a horrified crowd which was told that such would be their fate if they opposed socialism. [28] Throughout the war, the Chinese atrocities were so severe that even Baba Phuntsok Wangyal, a Tibetan communist leader, who held the important position of Vice President of Tibetan People's Political Consultative Committee protested against these atrocities and expressed his sympathy for the Tibetan struggle for freedom. [29] This eventually led to his arrest and imprisonment. The PLA Artillery Commander in Lhasa Col. Cheng Ho-Ching defected to the Tibetan side, recounting how he had simply become disgusted with killings and repression of the simple Tibetan people. He finally decided to support the Tibetan freedom fighters and fought against his former comrades. While serving in the PLA he had access to various official papers and records wherein he found that after severe fighting in Kham and Amdo around 40,000 Tibetans were killed. 

As the rebellion gathered momentum in 1955, bitter fighting raged around Lithang, Bathang, Derge, Chamdo and Kanze. It is estimated that tens of thousands of Khampa horsemen fought the Chinese. The fighting, at its peak involved, all sections of the eastern, central and southern Tibet, eventually leading to the massive demonstrations in Lhasa in March 1959. There was general fear among the Tibetans that the Chinese were planning to abduct the Dalai Lama. This fear became all the more acute when the Chinese army commander in Lhasa invited the Dalai Lama to a theatrical show in the military barracks on 10 march and that too, without being accompanied by his bodyguards. This invitation was met with strong opposition from the people who feared that Dalai Lama might become a victim of Chinese machinations.  

On March 10, a great concourse of the people of Lhasa flooded the grounds of the Norbulingka (the Dalai Lama's summer palace) and thousand more took up positions outside the enclosure, setting up defensive posts on all approaches. Their temper was made clear by the lynching of a Chinese emissary who tried to enter the palace in disguise. [30]  

To avoid the massive consequences of these mass demonstrations, the Dalai Lama urged the large gathering to disperse and wrote three letters to the principal Chinese General, Tian Kuan San in an effort to appease the Chinese and prevent impending violence. But, despite all his efforts, open fighting broke out in Lhasa, with disastrous consequences to the Tibetans. Thousand of Tibetans regardless of age, sex and status were brutally slaughtered by the PLA. No one knows how many were killed in the Lhasa Uprising which was repressed with a savagery reminiscent of the Nazis in Warsaw. Casualties may have been as high as 10,000. [31]   Two days later, several thousands of Tibetan women marched through the streets of Lhasa and called for the Chinese to get out of Tibet. Protesters were arrested and tortured for years. Bitter fighting raged throughout Central Tibet that lasted till early 1960s. Since then, Tibetan uprisings and demonstrations have continued. Tibet witnessed around 150 small and large demonstrations between 1987 and 1992, which were suppressed with brutal force. In March 1989 Tibet was put under martial law for the second time in its history, first being in 1959.  

Tibetan Youth Congress, while referring to this uprising in a statement issued on the 46^th National Uprising Day of Tibet stated, “The massive, popular and widespread uprising of March 10, 1959 ordained the Tibetan freedom struggle as a national movement with the proactive resilience and revolt of common Tibetans to fight for the sovereignty, identity and freedom of Tibet that stirred the collective consciousness of a Tibetan identity that united all Tibetans.” [32]