The so-called general election of 1961, through which China proclaims to have provided the Tibetans their democratic rights, is a farce. The candidates for the election were pre-determined by the Chinese on the basis of their loyalty and class background. The Tibetans were then told to vote for a certain number of candidates.  

According to Article 21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),  

The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine suffrage and shall be held by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.  

Not to mention the continuous disregard to the will of the Tibetan people, the very notion of the ‘genuine election' has been consistently violated by the Chinese authorities. Despite the claims made in the White Paper that the Chinese constitution provides all citizens of China over 18 years, the right to vote and stand for election, regardless of his ethnic status, race, sex, occupation, family background, religious belief, education, or length of residence, Tibetans and foreign observers unanimously testify that elections are mere puppet shows designed to legitimise Chinese claims that Tibetans enjoy democratic rights and autonomy. The voting system is predetermined and only those who have complete loyalty to the Communist Party are selected as candidates. Nobody stands in opposition to the candidates already chosen by higher Chinese officials but if anyone does then he/she will be regarded as anti-China, and declared unqualified for any representation. In most of the cases the names of the candidates would be announced only a few hours before the actual election and no one would really know who or what they were voting for. Besides, all these discontentment the people had to vote anyway because they were warned that if they didn't, they would be punished. Under such a direct threat Tibetans reluctantly go to cast their vote; a mere lip service to Chinese claims of democracy and no wonder the turnout of voters is high. [1]  

The Scientific Buddhist Association in their report submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights stated, “… this [Chinese] oppression is compounded by the fact that Tibetans are denied any voting freedoms”.  

Since China's invasion of Tibet in 1949, China has maintained tight control in Tibet through Tibetan and Chinese Party and government officials. In the 1950s, the Dalai Lama was given nominal titles in the structures set up by the Chinese authorities, including the Chairmanship of the so called Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet. The situation further deteriorated after the 1959 National Uprising and the involvement of the Tibetans in the government was almost absent. During the 1970s China continued to transfer many Chinese cadres to Tibet, upon whom they relied heavily to govern Tibet.  

At the Third Work Forum on Tibet, the Central Committee of the Communist Party announced “we should take effective steps to maintain the current ranks of Han cadres and transfer Han and other minority cadres from the hinterland to Tibet.” The few Tibetan cadres are concentrated in the United Front Work Department, a branch of the Communist Party, which can merely provide suggestions to the government and the Party. According to the law of the People's Republic of China on Regional Autonomy, the autonomous organs have to operate under ‘the uniform direction of the Central Government' and remain ‘subject to the approval by the Central Government and the National People's Congress' [2]  

In Tibet and even within the “TAR” Communist Party, it is the Chinese who hold all the key positions. The Secretary of the “TAR” Communist Party is the most powerful position in the “TAR” and this post has been held by Chinese since 1959 (Zhang Guhua, Zeng Yongya, Ren Rong, Yin Fatang, Wu Jinhua, Hu Jintao, Chen Kuiyuan, Guo Jinlong and now Yang Chuangtang). Tibetans suffer the most obnoxious form of racial discrimination against them. For example, when Chen Kuiyuan was transferred from the “TAR”, Raidi, a Tibetan who held the number two position in the communist hierarchy, should have been appointed in his place. However, Guo Jinlong, a Chinese, who ranked number three, was promoted ahead of Raidi to top the “TAR” administration. ‘right class' and the ‘Right Attitude' are the only qualifications for making progress in life and becoming an officer. Neither administrative ability, experience nor education are taken into account.

A Reality Check on the non-existence of “Ethnic Autonomy” in Tibet  

The Chinese constitution under section 6 of the ‘Organs of self-government of ethnic autonomous areas' proclaims that ‘The organs of self-government of ethnic autonomous areas are the people's congress, people's government, people's courts and people's procuratories of autonomous regions, autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties.” Stating the above mentioned constitutional provision, the White Paper issued by China in May 2004 pronounced that ‘Tibetan people enjoy, according to law, the equal right of participation in the administration of state affairs as well as the right of self-government to manage affairs of their own region and ethnic group', further endorsed by a host of figures.  

Thus a realistic study of the so-called organs of self-government of ethnic autonomous areas becomes mandatory to assess the actual participation of Tibetan people in managing their own affairs and to analyse the Chinese claims of Tibetan people enjoying full political right of autonomy.  

The Regional People's Congress  

One of the most widely acknowledged facts about the Chinese political system is that the People's Congress, be it at the national level or regional level of autonomous areas, is a rubber stamp congress. The people's congresses constitute in true words and deeds the state enacted drama of democracy, which doesn't enjoy any real authority over the policy directions, law etc. that it approves. The people's congresses are not subject to any liability to the people and are not answerable to the people for its decisions, which otherwise forms the true essence of democratic representations.     

At the National People's Congress itself, which meets annually to review and approve major new policy directions, laws, the budget, and major personnel changes - the initiatives are presented for consideration by the State Council only after previous endorsement by the Communist Party's Central Committee.  

The White Paper notes that the People's Congress has, as a credit to its autonomy, enacted certain ‘local regulations' on politically irrelevant subjects such as ‘Regulations of the Tibetan Autonomous Region on the Administration of Mountain Climbing in Tibet by Foreigners' amongst a few others. What it fails to mention is the fact that any decision over regulations that the People's Congress makes comes with a mandatory requirement of approval by higher Chinese authorities sitting in Beijing, without the consent of which no local regulation can be enacted.      

The much-vaunted People's Congress is a constitutional farce and matters the least when it comes to the actual formulation of state policies and enactment of laws etc. Any degree of representation in such congresses along with holding of nominal posts in its standing committees is more of a constitutional fiction than true democratic representation.  

The People's Regional Government  

China's President Hu Jintao is known for his distrust of Tibetans. His consolidation of power at Beijing corresponded with a series of policy measures designed to put more and more Chinese cadres at all levels of administration in Tibet.  

China's claims that ‘Tibetan and other ethnic-minority cadres make up the bulk of the cadres of the Tibet Autonomous Region, and fully exercise their right as the masters of society'. But the latest official statistics show that the number of Chinese cadres and government employees in Tibet exceed the number of Tibetan cadres and employees by a substantial margin. Even if we refer to the most recent statistics published in the Tibet Statistical Yearbook by China the share of Tibetans in cadre employment in the regional government was only 49.7 percent in 2003, with the rest filled up by migrant Chinese, down from 71.6 percent in 2000 despite the fact that the total cadre numbers had risen in 2003. More significantly, a large section of this replacement of permanent employees took place at the higher levels of government among the cadre workforce. The share of Tibetans employed as permanent workers in state-owned units also fell sharply, from 71 percent in 2000 to 53 percent in 2003. These statistics obtain greater significance in view of the fact that the regional government and units owned by it accounted for 94 percent of all the jobs in Tibet.  

Moreover, most of the Tibetan cadres are only low ranking officials and the numbers of the ‘leading cadres' having real power are very few. The appointment of Tibetans to government positions is a highly selective process based solely upon their ideological and political loyalty. The Tibetan cadres' have to suffer gross racial discrimination. For instance, they are instructed to withdraw their children from Tibetan schools in India and their homes are frequently inspected for pictures of the Dalai Lama and other religious articles. In February 1999 a new campaign was launched in the “TAR”, intended to improve the quality of the cadre specifically for  ‘enhancing the overall quality, particularly the ideological and political quality.' [3] The campaign stressed that cadres must take a positive stand on the new economic reform and ‘opening up' policies which encourages the massive influx of Chinese into Tibet. As a part of the campaign, the relatives of cadres working in Nyemo County (Lhasa Municipality) had to face new restrictions. The authorities instructed all monks and nuns related to the Tibetan cadres in the area to withdraw themselves from religious institutions. Under such restrictions, several monks and nuns were forced to renounce their vows. The relatives of those who disobeyed lost their government posts. [4] The Tibetan cadres have to work under Chinese ‘watchers' called ‘liaison officers' who scrutinize and authorize all of their decisions. The Chinese officers make all decisions of significance, including funding, the use of natural resources and all matters of political content. The Tibetan cadres' hence have little say in the decision making process.  

Efforts are also being made to accommodate as many Chinese cadres' as possible in the ‘TAR'. The TIN reports in 2001 indicate that increasing numbers of Chinese cadres are learning Tibetan at the University of Tibet in Lhasa. This will prepare them for future leadership roles in Tibet at village and county level. According to the TIN report in July 2001, a further batch of almost 7,000 Chinese cadres was dispatched to work in the TAR, as part of a central policy of assigning Chinese cadres to work in Tibet. [5]   

Tibetans are increasingly marginalized from the key growth generating sectors like the large-scale construction projects. The above stated statistics and the current policies of marginalisation and discrimination of Tibetans in cadre and state employment distinctly ascertain the fact that China, under the aegis of people's regional government, is sinicising Tibet and increasing Chinese presence at all levels of administration and in all fields of socio-economic pursuits. 

People's Courts and People's Procuratories  

Out of the three bodies in the Chinese judicial system which enforce law, the procuracy is the most important as it oversees the work of both the police and the courts.  

The personnel changes in the Tibet Autonomous Region announced on 29 September 2004 at the fourth meeting of the 8^th Standing Committee of the People's Representative Congress, starkly reflected the ethnic imbalance in appointments. Most of the removals and replacements took place within the judiciary, affecting the Intermediary Courts and in particular the procuracy departments of all six prefectures of the TAR, except Lhasa. Out of 13 appointees in the procuracy departments of the various TAR prefectures, only two were Tibetan cadres who appeared to be replacing Chinese and the TAR level, only one Tibetan out of five appointees was included in the procuracy while out of the seven new appointees to various intermediate courts, only one was Tibetan.  

The ethnic imbalance reflected in these appointments at the regional government as well as people's courts and procuratory level stand in sharp contradiction to and nullify the declared policies of the PRC as stated in the ‘National Minority Regional Autonomy Law' and directly contradict the claims of Tibetans ‘participating in the administration of state affairs' as declared in the White Paper.  

The Chinese constitution states that the court shall, in accordance with the law, independently exercise judicial power. But in reality, the Chinese judiciary is subject to policy guidance from both the government and the Communist Party. At the local and central levels, the government and particularly the Communist Party often interfere in judicial proceedings and dictate court decisions. In a report on the judicial system in China, BBC Online News quoted Xiao Tang, President of the Supreme People's Court of China as saying that “incompetent” judges are making the system unfair. [6]   The report also stated that among more than 200,000 judges in China, most of them have no legal training and have traditionally been appointed for political reasons.  

Mr. Xiao further added, “Courts have often been taken as branches of the government and judges viewed as civil servants who have to follow orders from superiors which prevents them from exercising mandated legal duties like other members of the judiciary.” In the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), too, the majority of judges have little or no legal background or training. Trials are conducted behind closed doors and defendants are not allowed legal representation. Though on paper the Chinese Criminal Law grants defendants the right to appeal within 10 days of sentencing, a successful appeal is rare.

 Legal safeguards for Tibetans detained or imprisoned were inadequate in both design and implementation. According to an official of the TAR Higher People's Court, all seven cities and prefectures had established Legal Assistance Centres, and 1,248 residents had received assistance by the end of 2003. However, people accused of political and other crimes did not have legal representation. Moreover, their trials were cursory and were closed when issues of state security were said to be involved.  

The unfair trial and conviction of Tulku Tenzin Delek, a respected Buddhist teacher, and his disciple Lobsang Dhondup; is a recent example. Both defendants were charged with alleged involvement in a bombing incident in the capital city of Chengdu and for engaging in “splittist activities”. Lobsang Dhondup was summarily executed on 26 January 2003, while Tulku Tenzin Delek was sentenced to death with two years reprieve which was later commuted to life imprisonment. The routine denial to Tibetan detainees to receive proper legal defence is a violation of the right to equality before the law as recognized in Article 10 of the UNDHR and Article 14(1) of the ICCPR.

Arbitrary Detention and Torture of Political Prisoners  

As the Government strictly controls information about all Tibetan areas, and also access to the TAR, it becomes difficult to accurately determine the scope of human rights abuses. But, according to the US report on Human Rights, “the Chinese authorities continue to commit serious human rights abuses, including extra-judicial killings, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial, and lengthy detention of Tibetans for peacefully expressing their political or religious views. The overall level of repression of religious freedom in the TAR remains high. Individuals accused of political activism and their families face harassment. There were reports of imprisonment and abuse of some nuns and monks accused of political activism. Security is intensified during sensitive anniversaries and festival days in some areas, and activities viewed as vehicles for political dissent, including celebration of some religious festivals, were suppressed.” [7]  

According to the Tibet Information Network (TIN), “approximately 145 Tibetans were imprisoned on political grounds, approximately two-thirds of them were monks or nuns. Approximately 60 political prisoners remained in the TAR Prison in Lhasa, most serving sentences on the charge of "counterrevolution," which was dropped from the Criminal Law in 1997. Chinese authorities have stated that acts previously prosecuted as counterrevolutionary crimes continue to be considered crimes under China's anti-subversion laws”.  

A wind up of the last year's incidence of killing, arrest and detention in Tibet exemplifies the degree of oppression Tibetans are undergoing at the hands of the Chinese authorities.

In January 2004, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that authorities in Sichuan's Tawu County, Kardze Prefecture, had arrested students Nyima Dorjee and Lobsang Dorjee for putting up pro-independence posters on local government buildings.

On 12 February 2004, Choeden Rinzen, a young monk at Lhasa's Ganden Monastery, reportedly was arrested for possession of a picture of H.H. The Dalai Lama and a Tibetan national flag.

In April 2004, RFA reported that authorities in Qinghai's Tsolho Prefecture had arrested Tibetan singer Namkha, as well as composer and Tibetan Buddhist monk Bakocha, for their music's implicit political content. Authorities reportedly confiscated CDs of Namkha and Bakocha's music.

·        In May 2004, Chinese State media reported that authorities jailed a Tibetan named Penpa after he ‘admitted' to causing a May 20 explosion near a television tower near Lhasa.

·        In August 2004, observers confirmed the release of Kunchok Choephel Labrang and Jigme Jamtruk, two monks from Labrang Tashikyil Monastery, Gansu Province. Authorities reportedly arrested the monks in April 2003 for possessing booklets containing speeches of the Dalai Lama.

·        In September 2004, RFA reported that authorities in Sichuan's Kardze Prefecture sentenced Tibetan Buddhist monks Chogri and Topden and layman Lobsang Tsering to 3-year jail terms for putting up pro-independence posters. The three were reportedly among a group of 60 individuals detained on July 27 at a reception ceremony at Chogri Monastery in Draggo County, Kardze. Witnesses claimed that police beat some of those detained. It was believed that the other 57 individuals initially detained had been released by year's end.

·        In October 2004, RFA reported that police in Qinghai's Golog Prefecture shot and killed Tibetan Buddhist religious leader Shetsul after he and other monks demanded that the police pay for medical treatment for injuries suffered while in custody.

Human rights watchdogs characterized China's human rights record in Tibet as 'poor' describing a situation whereby "authorities continued to commit serious human rights abuses, including execution without due process, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial, and lengthy detention of Tibetans for peacefully expressing their political or religious views." The use of torture is, in fact, endemic and common in all prisons and detention centres in Tibet, according to Human Rights Watch and the Tibet Information Network.  

Torture is outlawed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Every State is bound by the prohibition against torture as a matter of jus cogens, and China being a veto power in the UN, should not be allowed to make further mockery of the very principles of respect, confidence and faith that the other 191 member nations of the United Nations share and promote.  

Communist Party of China: The Masters of Tibet.

The most powerful position in Tibet is that of the Secretary of the TAR Communist Party, a post which no Tibetan has ever held. Beijing has directly appointed all the Party Secretaries since 1959 (Zhang Guhua, Zeng Yongya, Ren Rong, Yin Fatang, Wu Jinhua, Hu Jintao, Chen Kuiyan, Guo Jinlong and at present Yang Chuangtang). Senior Tibetan communist leaders like Phagpalha Gelek Namgyal and Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, named by China as examples of Tibetans holding government posts in the White Paper, belong to families of what China calls feudal class from whose clutches China boasts of having ‘liberated' Tibet.   

It is a general practice that Chinese cadres much junior to Tibetans in experience, age and service years bypass Tibetans to win key posts in the government. Moreover, whatever position a Tibetan occupies in the Chinese bureaucracy, he always has a junior Chinese official under him who exercises the real power.  

A deep-seated distrust and discrimination against Tibetans in all organs and levels of Chinese administration is evident from the above-mentioned facts. While China will continue to harp on the propagandist line of Tibetan people enjoying equal right of participation in the administration of state affairs and the right of self-government, it is but a matter of simple logic and conscience for the world to decide whether the Tibetan people are really the ‘masters of their own affairs'.  

Contrary to what is portrayed in the latest Chinese White Paper, there is very little political representation of the Tibetan people. In theory, Chinese law provides for Tibetan political representation by establishing a system of local autonomy.  

Article 5 (C) of the International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) states that State Parties should guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to enjoy  

… political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections­­—to vote and stand for election—on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level.  

In theory this right is also guaranteed under the Chinese Constitution and the Law on Regional National Autonomy:           

[O]rgans of self-government are established for the exercise of autonomy and for people of ethnic minorities to become masters of their own areas and manage the internal affairs of their own regions.  

But in practice these legal provisions are circumvented in ways that deny real autonomy. The Central Communist Party of China tightly controls and monitors each tier of administration and continues to enforce discriminatory policies against the Tibetan people.  

According to the Chinese constitution the CPPCC, which exists at national, regional, prefectural and county levels, provides a means by which the Party may formally canvas people's opinions and direct its view back to the people. This provision in the Chinese constitution would have us believe that the CPPCC is the perfect medium for Tibetans to raise the complaints of discrimination, malpractice and abuse in terms of employment, healthcare, education, housing, public representation etc. A closer examination would divulge that the Chinese Communist Party appoints the members of the CPPCC. Ironically, the basic requisite to become a member of  ‘a committee which is supposed to air the non-Party views', is to accept four specific principles—the leadership of the Communist Party, the guiding role of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought, the people's dictatorship, and the socialist road. [8]  

The White Paper boasts that at present, 29 Tibetans and persons of other ethnic-minority groups from Tibet serve as members of the CPPCC National Committee or members of its Standing Committee, and Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme and Pagpalha Geleg Namgyal serve as vice-chairmen of the CPPCC National Committee. But the fact remains that the CPPCC, like all other institutions set up by the state, is an empty promise confined only to paper on which it is printed.  

A closer assessment of the current political representation of Tibetans within the political system of the PRC, reveals five important facts.  

1.      The election system in the TAR is a farce. The candidates are predetermined, based on their loyalty and class background. The common people are then forced to vote for a certain number of candidates.  

2.      The number of Tibetan representatives in the Central government and Central CCP organs is small. [9] As Hungmao Tien notes: “While Peking can claim participation by all nationalities in the political process on the basis of percentage figures, their numbers have tended to be concentrated in less important organizations at the lower levels.” [10] Political representation on the local level involves little decision making power because the Chinese government and party structures operate on a centralist basis, in which the lower level is subordinate to the higher level [11] . TAR officials are subordinate to the Central government, while Tibetan officials in the Autonomous Counties and Prefectures are subordinate to their provincial governments.  

3.      In reality, it is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which makes policy and monopolizes power, while the ‘state implements policy and provides symbolic expressions of popular participation.' [12] As such, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) constitutes a semi-independent power block with a strong and pervasive influence on both the government and the army. CCP members dominate key government posts and have more real and effective power than non-party government officials, even those with higher ranks. The ‘Leadership by the Communist Party is one of the four cardinal principles on which Chinese politics is based. Significantly, Chinese autonomy law remains silent on the role of ‘minorities' in the CCP. Whereas the 1984 law on Regional Autonomy requires that Tibetans hold positions of authority in the TAR [13] , no such requirement exists with regard to positions in the CCP. Hence China's claim that the local organ of self-government in Tibet fully exercises the power of autonomy bestowed by the constitution and law is a farce.  

4.      The number of Tibetan cadres is not only very few; it is the Chinese cadres who hold the real positions both in terms of power and numbers. Tibetans suffer gross racial discrimination and are not considered trustworthy. ‘Right ideological attitude' and the ‘right class' are the only criterion for making progress.  

5.      Tibetan officials and Party cadres (a fortiori,) are either genuinely loyal to the Chinese regime or try to reform the system from within, the scope for which is extremely limited. Cadres who are suspected of  ‘inconsistent thinking' [14] , i.e. disloyalty, are sidelined or dismissed [15] .

Hence, it can be concluded that the political representation of the Tibetan people, on the local as well as central level, is titular and structurally inadequate both in law and in fact.